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Abstract — The core components of NATO’s automated
information systems (AIS) include directory services (DS),
e-mail, web services, and military message handling systems
(MMHS) to exchange information with similar capabilities in
NATO’s member nation systems or systems that are under
control of multi-national coalitions. NATO has developed the
concept of information exchange gateways (IEGs) to meet this
requirement. This paper introduces the concept of combin-
ing symmetric co-operative zones (CZs) to form these infor-
mation exchange gateways. A generic framework for the co-
operative zone network and security architecture is introduced
in support of co-operative zone development. It is shown
how a co-operative zone network interface can be integrated
with the NATO general-purpose segment communications sys-
tem (NGCS). Development of the NATO co-operative zones is
based on an evolutionary approach. A baseline co-operative
zone configuration, supporting directory services, e-mail and
web services, has been tested and validated on the allied sys-
tems interoperability testbed (ASIT). This paper reports the
results of the test and validation program. The paper con-
cludes with an overview of planned evolutionary steps for co-
operative zone development. Subjects covered in this overview
are extension of information services, enhancement of security
architecture, and operational deployment (i.e., scalability and
manageability).
Keywords — information exchange, firewall technologies, di-
rectory services, messaging services, web services, INFOSEC.
1. Introduction
NATO’s changing operational environment has caused
a dramatic change in the way commanders use their sup-
porting command control and information systems (CCIS)
to exchange information. As CCIS’s evolve from single-
purpose systems in single-level secure environments to
multi-purpose systems in multiple-level secure environ-
ments, it becomes impossible to build custom interfaces
for each possible permutation of information exchange and
still remain flexible and responsive to change.
Within NATO’s automated information system, the concept
of an information exchange gateway through symmetric co-
operative zones been introduced with the aim to manage
and control all information exchange through a single se-
cure entity with well-defined interfaces.
This paper will focus on the initial architecture of the IEG
concept that has been tested and validated in the NC3A
allied systems interoperability testbed and the evolution of
the concept into operational and more advanced variations.
2. Information exchange gateway
operational view
From the operational point of view an IEG can be charac-
terised by two features:
1) the information services that are passed through the
gateway;
2) the business case identifying the difference in secu-
rity level that is bridged by the IEG.
Information services can be end-user related services, such
as mail and web, but also be infrastructure or management
services, such as domain name service (DNS) and simple
network management protocol (SNMP).
Within the scope of the IEG program of work [1] three
configuration cases have been identified so far:
 Case A. NATO-SECRET to NATO-SECRET en-
claves that reside in environments under control of
NATO or NATO member nations. There are no inter-
connections to national CCIS networks. The Case A
gateway is sometimes classified as a NATO point of
presence (POP). From the POP boundary, the nation
has the responsibility to deliver the information ser-
vice to the user.
 Case B. NATO-SECRET to NATO National Secret-
HIGH systems that reside in environments under con-
trol of NATO member nations.
 Case C. NATO-SECRET to coalition secret systems
that fall under the responsibility of a Combined Joint
Task Force in which NATO is in the lead.
3. Information exchange gateway
architecture
The basic conceptual framework of the information ex-
change gateway through symmetric co-operative zones is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Information exchange between a sender and receiver, both
residing in separate local CCIS networks, will always take
place via the sender’s own CZ and through a symmetric CZ
under control of the receiver. No direct traffic is allowed
between two local CCIS networks other than that relayed
through the source and destination CZs.
The example in Fig. 1 shows this information flow from
a nation-X CCIS supporting service A to its counterpart in
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Fig. 1. Information exchange gateway through co-operative zones.
the NATO local CCIS (dashed information flow labelled 0).
This information flow that consists of 3 logical connections
(labelled 1 up to 3 in Fig. 1):
1) nation-X CCIS service A to nation-X CZ proxy ser-
vice A;
2) nation-X CZ proxy service A to NATO CZ proxy
service A;
3) NATO CZ proxy service A to NATO CCIS service A.
The information services that will be shared through a CZ
are to be established on a trustworthy network and se-
curity architecture. One of the basic principles of trust-
worthy computing is to work with well-defined restricted
interfaces. Another important principle is to avoid un-
necessary complexity (keep it simple). Therefore, the
architecture that has been adopted for the information
exchange gateway employs symmetric co-operative zone
modules (CZMs) at both ends of the IEG. This symmetry
requirement holds the number of CZM interfaces to a min-
imum.
In addition to symmetry the following design principles are
applied for the further development of the CZMs:
 Minimise the number of protocols that run across
the IEG.
 Minimise the volume of network traffic overhead that
is generated by a certain service.
 Standardise on common protocols.
 Avoid services or features that carry great risk with
respect to security vulnerabilities.
The following categories of IEG architecture will be ex-
plained in more detail:
1) security architecture;
2) network architecture;
3) backbone and management services architecture.
3.1. Security architecture
The CZ security architecture most closely resembles
a “screened subnet firewall configuration” based on a bas-
tion host that provides authentication and proxy ser-
vices [2]. Figure 2 illustrates the security elements com-
prised by a CZM. These are:
 A boundary protection device (firewall) that provides
the source environment (i.e., local CCIS) with the
protection required under NATO’s “self-protecting
node” guidance [3].
 A second boundary protection device (filtering
router) that manages and secures network paths, pro-
tocols and ports to other co-operative zones between
service peers at the fixed IP-to-IP-number level.
 An intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect at-
tempted exploitation of (emerging) security flaws that
occur in the CZM component systems.
The bastion host capability (providing both authentication
and proxy services) has been implemented in the following
fashion:
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Fig. 2. Co-operative zone INFOSEC components.
 CZ proxy servers to relay traffic from/to the
source/target servers in the local CCIS domain
(through the BPD/firewall).
 Proxy authentication by the BPD or as part of the
local CCIS system.
The chosen approach provides a high level of security, be-
cause there are three levels of defence to thwart intruders:
 The filtering router only advertises (limited) IP-
numbers of the CZ subnet – the local CCIS network
is invisible from the outside.
 The firewall only advertises and supports connection
from local CCIS concentrator servers and counterpart
proxy servers in the CZ.
 Potential emerging vulnerabilities are pro-actively de-
tected by the IDS.
The user information flow (Fig. 2) is redirected through
these three levels by seven consecutive connection steps.
3.2. Network architecture
For Cases A and B, where CZs of NATO or NATO mem-
ber nation controlled entities are involved, the NATO poli-
cies for interconnection [4] prescribe the application of net-
work encryption facilities to establish a trusted intercon-
nected CZ WAN.
NATO will establish a “backbone” infrastructure of NATO
CZs to which other, NATO national CZs, can connect. This
backbone infrastructure will be based on the draft NATO
general purpose communication segment architecture [5].
NATO national sites get connected to the NATO network
through the nearest NGCS access router. The CZs will
share one common (private) IP-space.
Fig. 3. Co-operative zone module NGCS interface.
Co-operative zones get integrated into the NGSC network
through IP-encryption, using the NATO IP-crypto equip-
ment (NICE) [6] and hooking into the nearest NGCS access
router. Figure 3 shows which network and security devices
a CZ uses to connect to the physical bearer network.
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Fig. 4. Information exchange gateway ASIT system diagram.
The configuration comprises the following devices:
– secure access (Fig. 3 – dashed line) router, used for
tunnelling through the IP-network;
– the NATO IP-crypto device (NICE);
– an unclassified access router (UAR);
– backbone router (BR);
– bandwidth management equipment (BME).
3.3. Backbone and management services architecture
In addition to the core IEG user services, backbone and
management services are needed to maintain the poten-
tially large network of CZM nodes. Examples of backbone
services are:
– time services (based on NTP);
– distributed replication services for some of the in-
volved user services and supporting services (e.g. di-
rectory services, DNS, etc.);
– redundant network and server backbone infrastruc-
ture.
Examples of management services are:
– naming and addressing (performed by the NATO
naming and addressing authority);
– network, systems, and services monitoring (e.g.
through SNMP);
– software and hardware configuration management
and distribution.
4. Baseline configuration
An IEG baseline configuration has been established in
the ASIT, to test and validate the concept of an IEG
through symmetric CZs. The baseline configuration sim-
ulates a Case A IEG providing the following information
services:
– e-mail based on X-400;
– web supporting HTTP and HTTPS;
– directory services based on LDAP version 3.
The directory service basically supports the e-mail address
book capability, and directory replication is supported.
A system diagram depicting the server, network and se-
curity components of the ASIT configuration is shown
in Fig. 4. The following IEG network domains were
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implemented based on the IP-subnet distribution as shown
in Table 1.
Tables 2–4 specify the ASIT components in further detail1.
The remainder of this chapter describes the detailed con-
figurations and lessons learned of the mail, web, directory,
and security services.
Table 1
ASIT IP-subnets
Subnet Specification
A NATO CCIS LAN
B NATO CZ
C
Routing domain in between the back-to-back
filtering routers
D Nation-X CZ
E Nation-X CCIS LAN
Table 2
NATO/nation-X CCIS components
NATO and nation-X
CCIS components
Product specification
Web server Microsoft IIS 5.0
Web proxy server MS ISA 2000 server
Mail server (MTA) Microsoft Exchange 5.5
Directory server MS Exchange 5.5 GAL
Meta-directory Microsoft MMS 2.2
Table 3
Nation-X CZ components
Nation-X CZ Specification
Filtering router CISCO 2500
IDS RealSecure
Firewall Checkpoint Firewall-1
Web proxy MS ISA 2000 server
Mail server (MTA) Microsoft Exchange 5.5
Directory server MS Exchange 5.5 GAL
Meta-directory Microsoft MMS 2.2
Table 4
NATO CZ components
NATO CZ Specification
Filtering router CISCO 2500
IDS RealSecure
Firewall Checkpoint Firewall-1
Web proxy MS ISA 2000 server
Mail server Microsoft Exchange 5.5
Directory server DCL (X500)
Directory replication hub DCL (X500)
1The Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP2 OS was used un-
less it is specified otherwise.
4.1. E-mail
The e-mail service is based on X-400. Each CZM con-
tains an X-400 mail transfer agent (MTA), based on the
MS Exchange 5.5 product [7], with two X-400 connectors
connecting to the local CCIS MTA and a peer co-operative
zone MTA. Figure 5 shows the mail flow and Exchange 5.5
site addressing as have been used in the testbed.
Fig. 5. Testbed e-mail configuration.
Table 5 gives an example specification of the X-400 con-
nector labelled as “NATO-TO-IEG-NATO”.
Table 5
Example X-400 connector specification
Feature Specification
Routing X400: C=OO;a= ;p=NATO-IEG;o=
IEG-NATO;X400: C=CC(nation-X);
a=;p=nation-X-CCIS;o=*
MTA 1988 normal mode
conformance
X400 link options BP-15 (in addition to BP-14)
Two way alternate
Allow exchange format
X400 body part IA5
Use the GDI from site addressing
Configuration of the e-mail infrastructure was straightfor-
ward. One issue that had to be resolved was related to
passing X-400 through the firewall that is configured with
NAT. X-400 connectors at both ends need to be configured
as if they are communicating on a fixed IP-path. Therefore,
an additional firewall rule had to be added enforcing adver-
tisement of a fixed IP-number for incoming X-400 traffic.
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Fig. 6. Directory replication.
4.2. Directory services
The testbed’s directory services closely follow the NATO
directory services interoperability model [8]. This model
is based on three layers of directory services:
1) custom system and application directories (lowest
layer);
2) enterprise directory, supporting all enterprise com-
mon directory information (middle layer);
3) border directories, created for sharing certain direc-
tory information with other organisations (top layer).
NATO and the nations have agreed to use a schema based
on ACP 133 [9] in the alliance domain. Also, the current
guidance is to use X.500 replication (DISP) to ensure that
all the DS data published into the alliance domain is avail-
able on every participating border directory service agent
(DSA). As every nation is responsible for its own border
DSA, it is very likely that they will be based on many
different products, and multi-vendor X.500 DISP interop-
erability is not guaranteed. Some nations may therefore
need to employ other replication techniques, e.g. based on
meta-directory technology, to ensure that their border DSA
is as well populated as those that are able to participate in
the automatic X.500 replication.
The filtering and synchronisation processes that control the
flow between the application and enterprise layers, and be-
tween the enterprise and border layers in the DS archi-
tecture, are commonly implemented using meta-directory
technology (based on LDAP version 3).
The following mapping of DS interoperability model enti-
ties has been implemented in the testbed:
 The NATO (enterprise) and NATO nation enterprise
directory are represented as the Exchange 5.5 global
address list (GAL), which is an LDAP version 3 read-
able/writable directory.
 The NATO border directory is based on X-500 (DCL
product) [10] and uses the agreed ACP133 schema.
 The nation-X border directory is based on an Ex-
change 5.5 GAL as a low-cost, easy to implement
LDAP readable/writable directory.
 An allied replication hub directory has been imple-
mented to facilitate directory synchronisation of bor-
der directories using the directory information shad-
owing protocol (DISP). This directory provides sub-
trees for NATO and NATO nations in which only
the owner of the information has write access and all
others have read access.
 Meta-directory technology has been implemented to
facilitate directory synchronisation.
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The test exercise that was executed on the testbed was to
synchronise e-mail recipients information in support of an
“allied recipients” subcontainer of the exchange e-mail ad-
dress list. Figure 6 shows the directory synchronisation
flow.
Information publication was achieved through:
 Publishing releasable mail recipient information from
the enterprise directory layer to the border directory
layer.
 Shadowing the published border directory mail recip-
ient information (subtree) to the counterpart subtree
in the hub directory.
Information download was achieved through:
 Shadowing the mail recipient information in the non-
owned subtrees of the NATO replication hub direc-
tory the border directory into the equivalent subtrees
in the border directory.
 Synchronising the mail recipient information in the
non-owned subtrees in the border directory with the
“allied recipients” container of the Exchange 5.5 (en-
terprise) directory.
The two protocols used for directory synchronisation were:
 DISP to synchronise the NATO replication hub
X-500 directory information with the NATO border
X-500 directory.
 LDAP version 3 to synchronise local CCIS direc-
tories with the border directories and to synchro-
nise the nation-X border directory with the NATO
hub X-500 directory. For configuration management
and control of LDAP based directory synchronisa-
tion the Microsoft meta-directory services tool was
used [11] by applying the Exchange 5.5 and generic
LDAP management agents.
An important lesson learned from the directory synchro-
nisation work is that the directory attribute-flow in be-
tween diverse systems (MMS processing rules, X-500 and
exchange GAL directory schema) requires a rigorous map-
ping scheme of attributes and attribute translation rules.
4.3. Web services
Since Case A users require seamless web services, there
must be a collaborating chain of local CCIS and CZ web
proxy services for HTTP(S) traffic. The web proxy servers
are responsible for routing of HTTP-traffic from/to browser
to/from the target web server, through the CZ web proxy
servers. No direct web server to browser traffic is al-
lowed.
The web proxy server chain (Fig. 7) handles HTTP-requests
for a “foreign” web page in the following way:
 An HTTP-request for a NATO CCIS web page hosted
by a NATO CCIS web server is made by a na-
tion-X user. It is redirected through the nation-X
proxy server to the nation-X CZ proxy server and
forwarded to the NATO CZ proxy server.
 The NATO CZ proxy server routes the request to the
downstream NATO CCIS proxy server that will then
finally connect to the target web server.
 The NATO CCIS target web server response is re-
turned through the NATO web proxy server and the
NATO CZ web proxy server to the nation-X CZ web
proxy.
 The nation-X CZ proxy routes the response back to
nation-X CCIS web proxy. This proxy will then
finally route the response to the requesting web
browser.
In the testbed experiment the Microsoft Internet accelera-
tion server (ISA) [12] was used to implement the required
web proxy server capability.
Fig. 7. Allied systems interoperability testbed web proxy chain.
Since the implementation is fully symmetric we will only
give the configuration settings of the NATO local CCIS
proxy server and the NATO CZ proxy server in Tables 6
and 7, respectively.
The configuration of the web proxy services (routes) was
straightforward in the test configuration. It is expected that
the live installation will need to be tuned (using caching,
etc.) to establish acceptable response times to the end-
user. It need to be noted that web browsing based on IP-ad-
dresses in “external” domains is not supported through this
method.
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Table 6
NATO local CCIS proxy settings
Attribute Setting
Client sets  NATO clients: subnet A
 NATO CZ clients: IP-address
NATO CZ web proxy server
Destination  NATO sites: *.nato.int
sets  Nation-X sites: *.nation-x
Protocol  Access allowed to HTTP(S) for
rules NATO clients and NATO CZ clients
 Access denied for FTP/Gopher for
both NATO and NATO CZ clients
Site and  Access to nation-X sites allowed
content rules to NATO clients
 Access to NATO sites allowed to
NATO CZ clients
 Access to NATO sites allowed to
NATO clients
Routing for  Requests to NATO sites retrieved
web browser directly from specified destination
applications  Requests to nation-X sites are routed
to a specified upstream server:
IP-address NATO CZ web proxy
server port: 8080
Table 7
NATO CZ proxy server settings
Attribute Setting
Client sets  NATO clients: NAT IP-address ad-
vertised by NATO CZ firewall (B.x)
 Nation-X CZ clients: IP-address
nation-X CZ web proxy server
Destination  NATO sites: *.nato.int
sets  Nation-X sites: *.nation-x
Protocol  Access allowed to HTTP(S) for
rules NATO clients and nation-X CZ
clients
 Access denied for FTP/Gopher for
both NATO clients and nation-X CZ
clients
Site and  Access to nation-X sites allowed
content rules to NATO clients
 Access to NATO sites allowed to
nation-X CZ clients
Routing for  Requests to NATO sites are routed
web browser to a specified upstream server:
applications NATO IP-address advertised by
NATO CZ firewall (B.x)
 Requests to nation-X sites are routed
to a specified upstream server:
IP-address nation-X CZ web proxy
server
4.4. Security and network services
In order to achieve the required level of security for
Case A the following features have been implemented on
the testbed:
 A firewall, based on an EAL-4 assurance level [13]
product, checkpoint firewall-1 [14], installed on a C2
configured Windows NT-4 (service pack 3) plat-
form [15]. In the testbed NAT has been implemented
to hide the local CCIS system address space. As
a measure of verification both NATO and nation-X
IP subnets were assigned the same IP address range
with identical IP addresses for the mail, directory,
and web servers on either side of the firewall. The
firewall rules support X-400, LDAP, HTTP, HTTPS.
 The filtering router has been setup to only allow
connections between peer servers in the NATO and
nation-X co-operative zone (e.g. MTA to MTA,
proxy server to proxy server, directory server to hub
directory).
 The intrusion detection system based on the realse-
cure product [16] has been connected to the CZ LAN
as a stealth (receive-only) probe and console. The
IDS monitors the traffic across the CZ in both direc-
tions, detecting incidents of known exploit attempts
against the CZ proxy servers or the security compo-
nents.
One important note to be made is that DNS is not required
as a supporting service to resolve names to IP-numbers, be-
cause all routing is done based on fixed configured “routes”
on an IP-to-IP basis through proxy routes, X-400 connec-
tors, and DISP/LDAP connections.
5. Co-operative zone technologies
evolution
The Information exchange gateway configuration that was
tested and verified in the ASIT is considered to be a base
line configuration. This baseline configuration will evolve
in the following technology areas:
 Addition of AIS functional services.
 Adding security services by hardening security and
developing Case B and Case C gateways.
 Development of backbone services.
The addition of functional services is a requirement that
is very much dependent on further developments in the
following areas:
 Migration of present custom interfaces from NATO
to NATO nations and coalitions.
 Deployment of new allied systems.
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 Operational requirements that lead to a requirement
for additional functional services. For example, a new
NATO system that will be deployed in the next
couple of years is the NATO messaging services
(NMS) system. The NMS will introduce the re-
quirement for additional services to pass through the
CZ to support a military message handling system
(MMHS) [17] and, potentially, a NATO public key
infrastructure (NPKI) [18].
Other services that are identified to be developed as a part
of the Bi-SC AIS core capabilities [1] might also be
candidates to get deployed as gateway services. Examples
are:
– conferencing services (based on H323);
– real-time data streams (RMP, RAP);
– distributed database (SQL);
– middleware and XML web services communications
features.
The two driving forces behind the further development of
security services are:
1) optimisation of security features of the Case A base-
line configuration;
2) additional security features required for Case B and
Case C.
Optimisation of Case A security services includes:
 Further development of intrusion detection patterns
and matching intrusion detection information at
a central level.
 Configuring the server installation templates up to
the C2 level [13].
 Shielding of the CZ IP-space to the local CIS network
IP-space. For this it is considered to implement either
NAT from CZ to local CIS or to run an IP-proxy
service in front of the BPD.
 Prescribe usage of security tools such as security
templates, virus checkers, vulnerability scanners for
configuration and operation of information services.
 Develop a concept for centralised monitoring of in-
trusion detection consoles.
For Case B it is envisioned that the security services will
not differ from Case A with the exception of the imple-
mentation of web publishing rules. The reverse proxy ser-
vice will be restricted based on access controls. A re-
quest will be authenticated to the BPD/firewall that pro-
vides access to the local CCIS web services by imperson-
ating a guest account in the local CCIS domain, based on
the authenticated service, group, or individual user account
level. The establishment of authentication services may be
supported through the implementation of a NATO public
key infrastructure [18] and the establishment of an allied
PKI interoperability profile. Initially, though, it is antic-
ipated that identification and authentication of authorized
users will be left as a locally-selected and operated func-
tion, with support from the NATO/national AIS staff as
required.
For Case C, the picture for security features looks very
different from the Case A security features. Case C is
only in a very early stage of concept development and it is
anticipated that the services supported across the CZ will
begin with 2-way messaging and directory services. Ad-
ditionally, (one-way) coalition-to-NATO file transfer, much
like the current interfaces between NATO and SFOR/KFOR
will need to be implemented. Security options for bidirec-
tional file transfer and web services are currently under
study.
Scalability and availability are very important features that
go together if the amount of interconnected CZs increases.
The following solutions are considered to master scalability
and availability aspects by establishing an IEG backbone
infrastructure:
– redundant CZs per NATO nation;
– multiple NATO CZs (covering regions and are in hot-
standby for backup);
– high availability requirements for the underlying net-
work layer (NGCS QOS);
– redundant paths (creating secondary connectors) for
MTA’s;
– distribution of NATO hub directory.
6. Conclusion
A baseline configuration for an information exchange gate-
way has successfully been tested and validated in the al-
lied systems interoperability testbed. Lessons learned are
taken for the further evolution and the operational deploy-
ment of the information exchange concept. The NATO C3
Agency is looking forward to a very busy period with the
NATO nations to test and implement the information ex-
change gateway concept and contribute to allied systems
interoperability.
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